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Abstract
Each year, the US Air Force Academy graduates nearly 1000 young men and women. To support the decision of
which cadets will be classiﬁed into which career ﬁelds, we describe a linear programming formulation with appealing
computational properties that enable it as the core of a decision support tool. We explore methods for measuring and
balancing cadetsÕ class standing, Air Force career ﬁeld requirements, and cadetsÕ career ﬁeld preferences in the context
of this model. Our computational experiments demonstrate the improvement of this method over previous classiﬁcation
approaches, yielding more than 10% increase in the number of cadets assigned to their top career ﬁeld choice and
yielding nearly a 100% reduction in the number of cadets not receiving any of their career ﬁeld choices. We also explore
alternative methods for measuring cadetsÕ career ﬁeld preferences and demonstrate the positive eﬀect of the new
measurement scheme on the overall classiﬁcation. Because of the short running time of this model, it will serve as a
ﬂexible, real-time component of the AcademyÕs classiﬁcation process.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Manpower planning; Human resources; Military; Linear programming; Network ﬂows

1. Introduction
Each year, the United States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, CO graduates and
commissions roughly one thousand young men
and women as Air Force oﬃcers. Following their
commissioning, each member of the graduating
class begins his or her service in one of nearly three
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dozen career ﬁelds. In past years, the process by
which each was assigned to a career ﬁeld was
manually intensive and often resulted in a signiﬁcant percentage of graduates assigned to ﬁelds in
which they had little prior interest.
In this paper, we describe an optimizationbased methodology for assisting the classiﬁcation
process, which is the process of matching graduating oﬃcers to career ﬁelds. The model balances
the personnel needs of the Air Force with individualsÕ career ﬁeld preferences and their performance during four years at the Academy. The
assignments suggested by the model provide an
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initial starting point for the AcademyÕs personnel
oﬃce and the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC)
in San Antonio, TX to make the ﬁnal Air Force
Specialty Code (AFSC) assignments. The speed of
the model and its ability to identify the marginal
value of alternate career ﬁeld allocations make it
an attractive real-time tool to support personnel
planners and analysts.
We make the following signiﬁcant contributions:

of 2001 and 2002. Our work with the Class of 2001
provided a baseline for this multi-year project, and
our work with the Class of 2002 served as a prototype and proof-of-concept of a complete classiﬁcation system. This work led to a fully automated
system that was adopted and implemented by the
Air Force for initial use with the Class of 2003.

• model and implement this decision problem as a
ﬂexible and easily-solved network ﬂow model;
• demonstrate the performance of the model
using data from the AcademyÕs graduating
classes of 2001 and 2002; and
• demonstrate the beneﬁts of collecting more detailed information regarding individual job
preferences.

Each fall, the Academy initiates the process of
collecting cadet AFSC preferences, ranking the
cadets relative to their peers, and assigning cadets
to career ﬁelds based on rankings, preferences, and
quotas (summarized in Fig. 1). We provide detail
on the major elements of this process.

This paper is organized as follows. We describe
the career ﬁeld classiﬁcation process and create a
network ﬂow model to aid in this process. We then
illustrate several methods for establishing tradeoﬀs between cadet preferences and their class rank.
To better match cadets with their top job choices,
we propose a change to the manner in which cadet
job preferences are measured. Finally, we examine
these methods when applied the graduating classes

Each fall, a central board of senior Academy
leaders convenes to provide an overall assessment
of each cadetÕs performance during his or her four
years at the Academy. This assessment takes into
consideration a cadetÕs academic performance,
athletic performance, and leadership involvement.
Their assessment is a combination of objective and
subjective measures that results in a score between
30 and 50 points for each cadet.

2. The Air Force career ﬁeld classiﬁcation process

2.1. Ranking cadets

USAFA Classification
Classification Process
Process
USAFA Board Process
(Section 2.1)
Split cadets
Split
cadetsinto
into
two panels
panels

AFSC Matching
Matching Process
Process
(Section 2.2)
2.2)
Cadet
ranks/scores
ranks/scores

Collect job
job prefs
prefs

AFSC
Targets

Panels score
score and
and
Board
Process
rank cadets
cadets

Normalize board
board
scores

Match cadets
cadets
to AFSCs
AFSCs
(Section 3)
3)

USAFA Cadet
Cadet Classifications
Classifications

Fig. 1. The AcademyÕs process of ranking its graduates and assigning them to initial career ﬁelds.
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This ‘‘AFSC board’’ consists of ten members
divided equally into two separate panels. The
composition of each panel ensures representation
from each of the AcademyÕs mission areas: academics, athletics, and leadership training. Each
panel evaluates between 450 and 500 cadets, depending on the actual graduating class size. For a
given panel, each reviewer rates only the members
from that panelÕs batch of cadets. Each panel member assigns each cadet a score between 6 and 10, and
the overall rating is a sum of the ﬁve panel membersÕ individual scores. The results from each panel
are standardized and combined into a single rankordered list of all cadets in the graduating class.
2.2. Classifying cadets
Cadets will enter a career ﬁeld in one of two
general categories: rated and non-rated. Rated cadets are those who will enter a ﬂying career ﬁeld
(i.e., pilot or navigator) and non-rated cadets are
those entering a non-ﬂying career ﬁeld. Each year,
AFPC oﬃcials determine the number of rated slots
available to the Academy. Pilot-qualiﬁed cadets
compete for those slots according to the rank they
receive from the AFSC board. In recent years,
nearly every physically qualiﬁed graduate received
a pilot slot. This report focuses upon the process of
classifying non-rated cadets into career ﬁelds.
All cadets are asked in the fall of the senior year
to pick their top six non-rated AFSCs and to
specify their preference on a 1–6 scale, with 1 indicating their top choice. In past years, this classiﬁcation followed a greedy matching process.
Beginning with the top ranked cadet (based upon
AFSC Board results), each cadet selected their
AFSC from the set of available AFSCs. In general,
this method assured the top of the rank ordering
of getting their top AFSC choice. The lower
ranked cadets were less likely to receive their top
choices and were increasingly likely to face a set of
AFSCs that were not among their original six
choices. Because of the limitations of this greedy
classiﬁcation process, we proposed a new optimization-based process for classifying cadets to
AFSCs. This process meets Air Force needs, rewards the AcademyÕs top performers, and recognizes the preferences of all cadets.
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3. Optimization-based classiﬁcation model
Given the described process, we oﬀer the following model to assist this classiﬁcation decision.
Let set I represent all non-rated cadets considered
in the selection process and set J denote all possible jobs (e.g., career ﬁelds). The value of assigning cadet i 2 I to job j 2 J is denoted by cij . We
defer the important discussion of how we arrive at
this value to later sections. AFPC provides target
quotas for each AFSC. More generally, we allow
AFPC to specify lower and upper limits for each
career ﬁeld, denoted by lj and uj .
Our primary decision is to determine the best
assignment of cadets to jobs (the deﬁnition of best
remains). We model this with the binary decision
variable, yij , which equals 1 if cadet i is assigned to
job j and zero otherwise. Through the use of slack
variables, we allow deviation from the upper and
lower limits for each job. The variable sþ
j is the
amount by which the number of cadets assigned to
job j exceeds the upper limit, uj . Similarly, s
j is the
amount by which we under-ﬁll job j. The cost of
violating the upper and lower limits are given by
djþ and dj , respectively.
With the goal of maximizing the value of assignments made for the cadets, oﬀset by the cost of
missing the Air ForceÕs objectives for each career
ﬁelds, we introduce the following optimization
model:
XX
X
 
max
cij yij 
ðdjþ sþ
j þ dj sj Þ
i2I

subject to :

j2J

X

j2J

yij ¼ 1

i 2 I;

ð1Þ

j2J

X

yij  sþ
j 6 uj

j 2 J;

ð2Þ

yij þ s
j P lj

j 2 J;

ð3Þ

i2I

X
i2I

yij 2 f0; 1g i 2 I; j 2 J ;

ð4Þ


sþ
j ; sj P 0

ð5Þ

and integer j 2 J :

Constraint set (1) forces the assignment of each
cadet to exactly one AFSC. Constraint set (2)
limits the number of cadets assigned to an AFSC
to the upper limit plus any deviation from that
limit. Constraint set (3) forces the number of cadets assigned to an AFSC to the lower limit minus
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any deviation from that limit. Constraint sets (4)
and (5) enforce the assignment variables to be binary and the AFSC deviation to be integral.
While the model allows deviations both above
the upper AFSC limit and below the lower AFSC
limit, AFPC typically speciﬁes a single target
quota for each AFSC and expects no deviation. As
such, we set the upper and lower limits to the
target quota and increase the costs of deviating (djþ
and dj ) from the target to be large so that the
model will satisfy the target quotas exactly.
To solve this 0–1 integer program, we only need
to solve its linear programming relaxation. This
model can be mapped directly to a network ﬂow
problem, which has the property that any solution
to the linear programming relaxation will be integral and, therefore, optimal (see [1]). Because of
the mapping, the formulation also has the integrality property and we need not consider methods
like branch and bound to ﬁnd the optimal integer
solution. Moreover, because this is a network ﬂow
problem, specialized algorithms (i.e., the network
simplex method) can be used to solve this model
within seconds. As such, the modelÕs fast run times
(i.e., seconds) make it ideal for supporting the
classiﬁcation process in real-time; reducing classiﬁcation iterations between the Academy and
AFPC from weeks to potentially hours.
Models of similar form have been used for
military personnel allocation, including decisions
to assign US Navy personnel to vacant jobs with
the goal of minimizing moving cost [9]. The details
of the implementation of the NavyÕs assignment
system, including issues such as user acceptance,
are described in Blanco and Hillery [2] and
Whisman et al. [12]. Krass et al [8] describe a nonlinear network optimization problem to assist the
Navy in determining assignments of personnel to
combat duty. Reeves and Reid [10] introduces an
interactive, preference-driven manpower planning
model for the US Army Reserves. This model
balances ﬁve objectives for the assignments within
a 100 person unit over the course of a one-year
planning horizon. Weigel and Wilcox [11] describe
a hierarchy of models that support the ArmyÕs
enlisted personnel system. The models are used to
support a variety of decisions, from policy-level
analysis to detailed, unit-level planning issues. Fi-

nally, optimization methods have been applied to
decisions of manpower scheduling, including the
assignment of service department workers with
specialized skills to jobs (see [4]) and the determination of a maintenance workforce specialization
structure and the assignment of speciﬁc tasks to
workers (see Dietz and Rosenshine [6]).
The problem we consider diﬀers from these
previous works in two key respects. First, we are
not considering one-to-one assignments of persons
to jobs; rather, we are assigning persons to career
ﬁelds, which have a required target for the number
of people. Second, our objective function does not
deal with explicit measures such as travel costs.
Ultimately, we are concerned with giving the
decision-maker, not the model, the ﬁnal say regarding the delicate trade-oﬀ between cadet preferences and their standing in the class.
3.1. The objective function
The output of the AFSC board is an aggregate
subjective score and subsequent rank order of each
cadet. The output of the cadetÕs career ﬁeld selection is a ordering, from 1 to 6, of their job preferences. These two outputs combine to form the
objective function coeﬃcients (cij ) of classifying
the jth job preference to the ith ranked cadet. In
this section, we discuss alternatives for combining
the inputs (i.e., cadet rank/score and job preference) into a single value that captures the appropriate trade-oﬀ between the two inputs. For
example, we might wish to make the top-ranked
cadetÕs second choice (c1;2 ) equal to the middle
cadetÕs top choice (c163;1 ). The exact trade-oﬀ depends on the decision-makerÕs preference. In fact,
decision-makers are more concerned with the net
eﬀect of the objective function (i.e., the impact
upon the overall classiﬁcation of cadets) than the
function itself. In this section, we ﬁrst describe
methods to represent the value associated with a
cadetÕs class rank, vðiÞ, that will give us a ﬂexible
method for capturing this trade-oﬀ. We then show
how this value is combined with each cadetÕs
AFSC preferences, prefði; jÞ, to yield the modelÕs
objective function coeﬃcients:
cij ¼ f ½vðiÞ; prefði; jÞ :

ð6Þ
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300
250

v(i)

In Section 3.2 we describe alternatives for representing vðiÞ and in Section 3.3 we describe methods
for representing prefði; jÞ. In Section 3.3, we
will present methods to better measure job
preferences and build them into the objective
function.
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3.2. Valuing a cadet’s rank, v(i)

50

There are many ways to represent the value
awarded when cadets receive their top AFSC
choice. This value is one component of the overall
function described in (6). In general, we assume
that the value curve, vðiÞ, should be strictly decreasing with respect to class rank. The general
shape of the curve will have a drastic eﬀect upon
how the optimization model makes trade-oﬀs between the AFSC classiﬁcation for persons with
diﬀerent class standing. In this section, we explore
three such curves: (1) vðiÞ displays a constant
marginal reduction as class rank increases, (2) vðiÞ
displays a diminishing marginal reduction as class
rank increases, and (3) vðiÞ is determined by the
actual AFSC board score.
3.2.1. Constant marginal diﬀerence
In general, we would like the value awarded
for matching cadets with their top choice to be a
linear, diminishing function of board rank. That
is, the ﬁrst cadet receives the greatest value. The
diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and second cadets
will be the same as the second and third, which
will be the same as the third and fourth, and
so on.
Thus, the value received due to cadet rank is
given by
vðiÞ ¼ N  rankðiÞ;

ð7Þ

where N is the number of graduates. If we care
only about the cadetÕs standing relative to their
non-rated peers, N is the number of non-rated
cadets and rankðiÞ is cadet iÕs rank within the nonrated group. Note that this is a linear function of
rank, as shown in Fig. 2, where N is 327 (the
number of non-rated cadets in 2001). Again, this
curve represents the value awarded whenever a
cadet receives his or her top choice AFSC.

0
0

100

200

300

400

Cadet Rank
Fig. 2. Value received for ﬁrst choice as a linear function of
board rank.

3.2.2. Decreasing marginal diﬀerence
Again, we would like the value awarded for
matching a cadet with their top choice to be a
decreasing function of class rank. In this section,
marginal change in this value, vðiÞ, should increase
rapidly as we move toward the top of the class.
This function is consistent with the philosophy
that ‘‘top’’ cadets have truly distinguished themselves in their four years at the Academy. The
marginal diﬀerence decreases as we move lower in
the class rank.
To capture this philosophy, we employ a
learning curve function (for example, see [3]). Assume N is the total number of cadets, and a is a
number between 0 and 1 that represents a rate of
learning (or the slope of the learning curve). Let i
be the cadetÕs rank. Then the value awarded for
assigning each cadet is
vðiÞ ¼ N ilog2 a :

ð8Þ

When a is, say 0.95, the learning curve reduces the
value by 5% each time cadet rank is doubled. In
our application, the value of assigning cadet #2Õs
top choice returns a value that is 5% less than
cadet #1Õs. Assigning a top choice to cadet #4 has
a value that is 5% less than cadet #2Õs, and so
forth. This function provides marginal changes
consistent with the philosophy of rewarding top
performers. Fig. 3 shows the 95% learning curve
for N ¼ 327.
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3.3. Accounting for career ﬁeld preferences,
pref (i,j)

Value versus Class Rank
350
300

v(i)

250
200
150
100
50
0
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Class Rank
Fig. 3. Value received for the ﬁrst choice is a decreasing function of board rank, with decreasing marginal diﬀerence.

3.2.3. Board score approach
Our ﬁnal curve once again assumes that the
value function, vðiÞ, decreases with class rank. In
this section we introduce a function that provides
both increasing marginal rewards for top performers and increasing marginal penalties for low
performers. In order to entice the model to give
more top choices to the top ranked cadets, it must
be increasingly diﬃcult for the lowest ranked cadets to get their top choices. Thus, in the lower tier
of class rank, the marginal penalty increases as we
near the bottom. Interestingly, plotting AFSC
board score (see Fig. 4) gives the desired distribution of values, vðiÞ. Moreover, this method uses
direct output from the AFSC board as an input to
the model.

Normalized Board Score

8.000
7.000
6.000
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1.000
0.000
1

Class Rank

Fig. 4. Value received based on board ranking.

In the previous sections, we described three
methods for representing a baseline value, vðiÞ, for
assigning the top choice to cadets based upon their
board rank/score. We now create the objective
function, cij , by combining the rank value, vðiÞ,
with the preferences, prefði; jÞ, that each cadet
assigns to each AFSC. The current method relies
solely upon the 1–6 preference scale provided by
cadets. We also consider a second method that
captures the relative preference (or indiﬀerence)
between their six career ﬁeld choices.
3.3.1. Ordinal preferences
We denote cadet is preference for job j by
prefði; jÞ, which equals 1 for their top choice and 6
for their 6th choice. We let prefði; jÞ ¼ 0 when job
j is not one of the cadet is top six choices. The
objective function coeﬃcient that combines both
rank and preference is given by
8
< vðiÞ
; when prefði; jÞ > 0;
cij ¼ prefði; jÞ
ð9Þ
:
vðiÞ;
otherwise:
Fig. 5 displays the board score (see Section 3.2.3)
family of functions. The top curve in the ﬁgure
represents the value of assigning cadets their top
choice. The second highest curve shows the value
of assigning cadetsÕ to their second AFSC choice.
The third through sixth curves represent assigning
cadets to their third through sixth AFSC. The
bottom curve is the negative of the top choice and
applies whenever a cadet is assigned to an AFSC
not listed as one of their top six.
Note that the bottom ranked cadet receives the
same value (i.e., 0) for all career ﬁelds. The model
will be indiﬀerent about which career ﬁeld to assign this cadet. We can add an additional parameter to this method that helps control the extent to
which the lower ranked cadets are sacriﬁced for
the beneﬁt of the others. The objective function
coeﬃcients determined in (9) become
8
< vðiÞ þ k ;
when prefði; jÞ > 0;
cij ¼ prefði; jÞ
:
ðvðiÞ þ kÞ; otherwise:

Objective Function Coefficient Value
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-6
-8

1
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-10

Board Rank
Fig. 5. Value received based on class rank and career ﬁeld preference; receiving a non-preferred career ﬁeld is penalized.

The eﬀect of this change is that the curves in Fig. 5
become increasingly separated as we increase the
constant, k. This increase causes the model to
avoid assigning cadets to non-preferred jobs. Rather than selecting an a priori value for k, we vary
this parameter to provide decision-makers with a
set of possible classiﬁcations from which to
choose.
3.3.2. Relative preferences
Our primary measure of the modelÕs performance was the number of cadets receiving their
top preference(s). Given this, we readdress how
preferences are measured. When ranking jobs on a
scale of 1–6, we have no information regarding the
relative preference between job selections. A model
that uses the objective function coeﬃcients described in (9) assigns signiﬁcantly diﬀerent values
to a cadetÕs ﬁrst and second AFSC. However, it
might be the case that the cadet is indiﬀerent between the two AFSCs. In this situation, awarding
the cadetÕs second choice (based upon the forced
rank ordering) may free a slot that enables a lower
ranked cadet to receive a higher preference.
Modifying our approach for creating the objective function coeﬃcients is straightforward. We
deﬁne rði; jÞ as the relative satisfaction cadet i has
for job j. A cadetÕs top preference(s) will receive a
relative satisfaction of 1, and all other preferences

have a value less than one. For each cadet i 2 I
and job j 2 J the objective function coeﬃcients are
given by

rði; jÞ vðiÞ if rði; jÞ > 0;
cij ¼
ð10Þ
vðiÞ
if rði; jÞ ¼ 0;
where vðiÞ is determined by methods such as the
three discussed earlier.
A number of mechanisms can be use to solicit
relative preferences from the cadets. But the
overall idea is the same: to gain some recognition
of how each cadet feels about their six job choices.
Capturing individual preferences is superior to any
of the arbitrary preference schemes inherent in the
1–6 ranking process. The bottom line is the impact
upon classiﬁcations: which cadets receive which
jobs. Because individual preferences and AFSC
quotas greatly aﬀect the classiﬁcation of each
graduating class, we do not anticipate developing a
‘‘correct set’’ of value functions. Instead, we develop a process that enables decision-makers the
ability to easily, and quickly, explore the eﬀects of
alternative functions.

4. Computational results
In this section, we oﬀer empirical results that
demonstrate the success of this optimization-based
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classiﬁcation model. We begin with computational
results from the Class of 2001 and demonstrate the
solution quality and its improvement over the
traditional greedy approach described in Section 2.
We then illustrate the eﬀects of objective function
changes upon the modelÕs solution. We next turn
to the Class of 2002, with whom we examine the
eﬀect of using individually speciﬁed preferences
{see (10)} rather than the 1–6 ranking of a cadetÕs
six AFSC choices {as prescribed in (9)}.
Because this decision support environment relies upon Excel spreadsheets and Access databases,
we opted to model within a spreadsheet environment on a Pentium III workstation. We implemented the model using both the Large-Scale
Solver from Frontline Systems [7] and XPRESSMP version 13.0 [5]. The Frontline solver is the
large-scale version of the Excel Solver. To use
XPRESS-MP, we linked the solver to the spreadsheets using ODBC connections and SQL. The
fact that this model is a network ﬂow problem
means the optimal linear solution is always integer
and, hence, solve times are fast. We do not report
solution times because the model solves in seconds,
which is more than suﬃcient for the purposes of
our model.
4.1. Results for Class of 2001
Of the graduating class of 2001, 327 graduates
were classiﬁed into non-rated AFSCs. The AFPC
initially speciﬁed 322 target quotas across 36 career ﬁelds, and allowed the Academy to classify the
additional 5 cadets into their preferred AFSCs. We
penalized deviation from each AFSC quota heavily. Thus, the model matched each AFSC quota
exactly (aside from the diﬀerence between graduates and total target quotas).
4.1.1. Comparison with greedy classiﬁcation
Our ﬁrst goal was to compare the modelÕs solution to that generated by the greedy classiﬁcation
approach. This greedy method begins by awarding
the top-ranked cadet their ﬁrst choice. We simulate
the greedy method by decrementing the number of
remaining slots in that career ﬁeld and turn to the
second ranked cadet. This cadet selects their
highest choice among the remaining available

slots. The process continues until all cadets are
classiﬁed. If, in our simulated heuristic, a cadet
ﬁnds no slots among their six choices, we proceed
to the next cadet and the process continues. At the
end, we randomly assign the cadets who did not
receive one of their top six choices to the remaining slots. In practice, a cadet who ﬁnds no available openings throughout their original six choices
makes a selection from any of the available
openings rather than risk a random classiﬁcation.
Therefore, as we compile the statistics on the
number getting one of their six choices versus a
non-preferred career ﬁeld, our heuristic over estimates the number getting one of their AFSC
preferences. Recall that our heuristic does not allow a cadet to ‘‘take away’’ a preferred AFSC of a
lower ranked cadet if none of their preferences
were available. Thus, the quality of the solution (in
practice) can only be worse than the results reported.
Table 1 provides both the results obtained using
the optimization versus the greedy heuristic. The
‘‘# assigned’’ columns indicate the number of cadets who received their ﬁrst choice, second choice,
and so forth (proceeding down the rows). Notice
the diﬀerence between the numbers of ﬁrst choices
given using the optimization versus the existing
greedy approach. Moreover, the number of ‘‘nonpreferred’’ jobs assigned is reduced from 12 to either 0 or 3, depending upon the objective function
used. Thus, cadet preferences are better satisﬁed
using the optimization. Presumably, this will have
a positive eﬀect on morale and long-term commitment to the Air Force.
4.1.2. Viewing alternative solutions
Comparing the results from the objective function reported in Table 1, we see a diﬀerence that
seems to indicate the learning curve objective
function (Fig. 3) gives a better aggregate solution.
The learning curve model reports more ﬁrst preferences received and zero ‘‘non-preferred’’ choices
received. However, this may be misleading as we
examine the diﬀerences more closely.
Fig. 6 displays the AFSC preference received of
all 327 cadets using the two objective functions.
While the learning curve objective function yields a
greater number of ﬁrst choices, notice the large
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Table 1
Results for the Class of 2001, comparing the model using two objective functions with the greedy approach to job classiﬁcation
Job preference

Model results
Greedy Heuristic

1
2
3
4
5
6
No. pref

Learning curve objective

Board score objective

# Assigned

Cum%

# Assigned

Cum%

# Assigned

Cum%

215
53
18
13
12
4
12

65.7
82.0
87.5
91.4
95.1
96.3
100.0

248
42
14
7
9
7
0

75.8
88.7
93.0
95.1
95.9
100.0
100.0

244
40
10
6
14
10
3

74.6
86.9
89.9
91.7
96.0
99.1
100.0

functions. Given that each yearÕs data changes
dramatically, it is not sensible to expect that an
objective function will have the same eﬀect on the
classiﬁcation. We emphasize that the model does
not establish policy. Rather, the model provide
multiple solutions quickly, from which the AcademyÕs decision makers can determine the trade-oﬀs
and classiﬁcation policy they prefer.

The 45th ranked
cadet received his
fourth preference

Job Preference (0 = No Pref)

Job Preference versus Class Rank
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
0

50

100

(a)

150

200

250

300

350

4.2. Results for Class of 2002

Class Rank

Job Preference versus Class Rank
7
Job Preference

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
0

(b)

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Class Rank

Fig. 6. Graph of job preference received versus class rank using
both the learning curve objective function (a) and the board
score objective function (b).

number of cadets in the top quarter of the class
who did not get their ﬁrst choices. Conversely, the
board score objective function does award three
cadets AFSCs for which they had no preference,
but these three cadets are at the bottom of the
class. The overall eﬀect of the board score objective
function is that the model sacriﬁces the preferences
of cadets at the bottom of the class to free higher
preferences for those near the top of the class.
It is not our goal to specify a single objective
function that will dominate all other objective

We developed the prototype of this model while
the Class of 2001 classiﬁcation was in-process.
Because of the apparent success of the model as
applied to the Class of 2001, we conducted a full
proof-of-concept during the Class of 2002Õs classiﬁcation process. This class had similar characteristics to the previous class: 348 graduates were
classiﬁed into 37 non-rated AFSCs.
4.2.1. Comparison with greedy classiﬁcation
During the 2002 classiﬁcation process, senior
decision-makers speciﬁed an additional condition:
the top 25% cadets in the class were guaranteed
their top AFSC preference (assuming they were
qualiﬁed). We added the following constraints to
the model to enforce this requirement:
yij ¼ 1;
and

8ði; jÞ : rankðiÞ 6

N
4

prefði; jÞ ¼ 1;

where N is the number of cadets. In addition, we
penalized heavily deviations from AFSC quotas
until the model ﬁlled the targets exactly. Finally,
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Table 2
Comparison of Greedy Heuristic and the actual classiﬁcation with the optimization model for the Class of 2002
Job preference

Model results
Greedy Heuristic

1
2
3
4
5
6
No. pref

Actual classiﬁcation

Board score objective

# Assigned

Cum%

# Assigned

Cum%

# Assigned

Cum%

202
59
29
12
14
9
22

58.2
75.2
83.6
87.0
91.1
93.7
100.0

218
57
25
16
9
10
12

62.8
79.3
86.5
91.1
93.7
96.5
100.0

240
54
15
9
11
15
3

69.2
84.7
89.0
91.6
94.8
99.1
100.0

we used the board score (Section 3.2.3) approach
within the objective function.
The results are displayed in Table 2. The model
outperforms the greedy heuristic, moving the percent of cadets receiving their ﬁrst choice from 58%
to just over 69%. The number of cadets receiving
none of their job choices dropped from 22 to 3.
Thus, applying the optimization-based classiﬁcation model to the Class of 2002 data yield similar
results to those found with the Class of 2001 data.
In addition, Table 2 shows a summary of the actual classiﬁcation created by the AFPC who also
used an optimization-based approach. We see the
clear advantage of our model both in terms of the
increase in the number of graduates assigned to
their top choice and in terms of the decrease in the
number of graduates assigned to none of their
choices.
4.2.2. Preference experiment
Prior to the actual classiﬁcation process, during
the spring of their junior year, we collected information regarding AFSC preference beyond the 1–
6 ranking. We surveyed 350 participants (both
rated and non-rated cadets) and compared the
AFSC classiﬁcation using this additional information {see (9)} with the existing 1–6 ranking
procedure (8).
The method we used to capture relative preferences follows. We gave each cadet 1000 points to
allocate among six AFSCs. Assigning an equal
number of points to all six AFSCs indicates indiﬀerence among the six. Allocating all points to a
single AFSC indicates a strong preference for that

single career ﬁeld, but indiﬀerence among all remaining AFSCs. All non-selected AFSCs received
zero preference points.
The relative satisfaction of a cadet-AFSC classiﬁcation was found by dividing the points the
cadet assigned to that AFSC by the maximum
points the cadet assigned to any single AFSC.
That is, for each cadet the value of rði; jÞ used in
Eq. (9) is found by dividing the number of points
assigned to AFSC j, pði; jÞ, by the maximum
awarded to any AFSC by that cadet:
rði; jÞ ¼

pði; jÞ
pði; j0 Þ:
maxj0

ð11Þ

While there are a number of ways to collect and
measure these relative preferences, this method
renders a [0–1] scale.
Using board scores (Section 3.2.3) as the basis
for the objective function coeﬃcients, we ﬁrst
compare the models with the diﬀerent preference
measures in the objective function. In Table 3, we
show how each model performs by counting the
number of 1–6 preferences actually assigned. On
the surface, using the relative preferences appears
to hurt the quality of the solution. Fewer people
receive their top choice. A more precise performance measure is how the models compare with
respect to the relative preferences.
In Table 4, we see the positive eﬀect of using the
relative preferences in the objective function. The
scale used in the left column shows the relative
preferences. If a cadet receives a job for which they
had assigned maximum points, their satisfaction
level is 100%. Furthermore, if a cadet was indif-

A.P. Armacost, J.K. Lowe / European Journal of Operational Research 160 (2005) 839–850

849

Table 3
Preference received (on the 1–6 scale) using either 1–6 preferences or relative preferences in the objective function
Job preference

1–6 preference used in objective function

Relative preference used in objective function

# Assigned

Cum%

# Assigned

Cum%

227
43
17
20
19
19
5

64.9
77.1
82.0
87.7
93.1
98.6
100.0

209
56
25
19
17
19
5

59.7
75.7
82.9
88.3
93.1
98.6
100.0

1
2
3
4
5
6
No. pref

Table 4
Preferences received (measured with the relative scale) using
either 1–6 preferences or relative preferences in the objective
function
Satisfaction
level (%)

100
90+
75+
50+
25+
10+
<10
0

Job preference measure
1–6 ranking

Relative preferences

#

Cum%

#

Cum%

234
0
8
25
20
22
29
12

66.9
66.9
69.1
76.3
82.0
88.3
96.6
100.0

238
5
14
37
17
15
19
5

68.0
69.4
73.4
84.0
88.9
93.1
98.6
100.0

ferent between his two top AFSC choices (which
is impossible to determine in existing 1–6 ranking system), then being classiﬁed into either of
those AFSCs would yield 100% satisfaction. Using
the relative preferences, we see a large increase
(from 76.3% to 84%) in the number of cadets
at least 50% satisﬁed and a corresponding reduction in the number of unsatisﬁed cadets. Thus,
adding relative preferences provides additional
ﬂexibility to better meet the desires of the graduation class.

5. Concluding remarks and future work
This optimization-based approach for the
AFSC classiﬁcation process provides a ﬂexible tool
to support the decision authorities at the Academy
and the AFPC. We emphasize that from year-toyear, variation in the data exists such that selecting

a single method for creating the objective function
is not sensible. The ease of incorporating diﬀerent
objective functions and the fast run time of the
model allow us to quickly create a set of solutions
that best reﬂect the philosophies of decision-makers.
In addition, our explorations of using actual
AFSC preferences indicate value-added in changing from the current 1–6 ranking system. Clearly
actual preferences provide more relevant information than arbitrarily assigning preferences to
each classiﬁcation. However, obtaining true preferences ignores the presence of gamesmanship,
which is likely. We have not explored this eﬀect.
Future extensions to the system include a webbase mechanism for displaying information about
each AFSC, its projected availability, and current
cadet interest in each AFSC. This website will
collect preference data supporting the optimization. It will alleviate much of the time-consuming
process of advising and counseling cadets about
the likelihood of receiving certain AFSCs. The
manner in which these relative preferences are
collected is an area of further study. Finally, the
fact that this model is a network ﬂow problem
(thus, the optimal linear solution is always integer)
means we can exploit dual information to provide
feedback on the relative interest of certain AFSCs.
The duals could be the basis to coordinate target
quotas and the AFSC classiﬁcation across all three
commissioning sources: the Academy, the Reserve
Oﬃcer Training Corps (ROTC), and the Oﬃcer
Training School (OTS).
Because of the demonstrated success of our
model, AFPC has revised their process. They have
implemented and will utilize this optimization
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model for the graduating class of 2003. In addition, the Personnel Center is modifying existing
software to incorporate this classiﬁcation model
for both ROTC and OTS career ﬁeld classiﬁcations.
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